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INTRODUCTION
Microfinance is banking for the poor. Mission, target group, and the applied credit technologies are features clearly distinguishing microfinance from the traditional banking sector. Moreover, the industry seemed to be less exposed to financial turmoil. Evidence from financial crises episodes in Asia and Latin America in the 1990s suggests that loan portfolio growth and quality of microfinance institutions were substantially less affected by financial turmoil than portfolio growth and quality in the traditional banking sector. This paper presents an in-depth analysis of developments in the microfinance sector before and after the Lehman collapse by comparing them with developments in traditional banking sectors of developing countries (DCs) and emerging markets economies (EMEs). The findings suggest that in the precrisis years microfinance was characterized by features similar to those prevailing in traditional banking. Most importantly, the microfinance sector joined the overall credit boom in several EMEs and DCs. Like in the traditional banking sector, this boom was fostered by substantial capital inflows. Credit booms funded by strong capital inflows are good predictors of financial turmoil. This raises the question whether the crisis resilience observed in previous years has remained a characterizing feature of the microfinance industry in the global financial crisis.
Our findings indicate that the current financial crisis has had a substantial impact on the microfinance sector. In particular, microfinance markets with strong capital inflows, high credit growth rates and rising levels of competition in the pre-crisis period have been affected. Moreover, like in the traditional banking sector, credit growth has dropped significantly and portfolio quality has deteriorated markedly in the post-Lehman period. Thus, while microfinance and traditional banking still exhibit structural differences, the evidence suggests that they exhibit increasingly stronger conjunctural similarities.
The paper is structured as follows. Section two reviews the literature on the performance of the microfinance sector in previous DC and EME financial crises. Section three presents basic data on capital flows and credit growth in the microfinance and the traditional banking sector before and after the Lehman collapse. Section four analyzes the impact of rapid credit growth on financial stability in both sectors and section five provides a summary and conclusion.
THE PERFORMANCE OF MICROLOAN PORTFOLIOS IN TIMES OF FINANCIAL CRISES -A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Microfinance, traditional banking and financial turbulences -evidence from previous crises in emerging markets
Microfinance has earned the reputation of being fairly immune to financial crises on the basis of case study results and cross-country evidence. Examining the correlation of microfinance and traditional banking with international and domestic market performance measures, the latter find that the microfinance sector shows almost no correlation with developments in global capital markets whereas the traditional banking sector does (Krauss and Walter, 2008) . This suggests that microfinance is more insulated from the macroeconomic and financial environment than traditional banking. Analyses by Ahlin and Lin (2006) and Gonzalez (2007) also indicate that fluctuations in domestic GDP have only a limited impact on the quality of microloan portfolios.
Turning to the evidence from selected case studies, McGuire and Conroy (1998) analyze the performance of the microfinance sector in Indonesia during the East Asian crisis. They find that during the crisis the strategic business unit (SBU) "microbanking" of Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) 1 recorded only a slight increase of non-performing loans (NPL), expressed as a share of total loans, while the NPL ratio of other SBUs rose substantially. Moreover, Patten, Rosengard and Johnston (2001) report that the loan portfolio of BRI's microbanking unit did not fall during the crisis and that growth resumed as early as 1999, with the portfolio increasing around 34 percent in 2000.
The Latin American experience also points to smoother credit growth and higher portfolio quality in the microfinance sector compared to the traditional banking sector in crises times. For example in the Ecuadorian banking crisis of 1999, Banco Solidario, a bank providing microenterprise loans and traditional loans, recorded a stable portfolio quality combined with a substantial increase in net profits on its microenterprise loans (Arora and Harper 2005) . In Bolivia, the 1999 financial crisis led to a substantial decline in traditional bank portfolios which lasted until 2003. By contrast, compared to the traditional bank portfolio the aggregate microfinance portfolio growth rates in Bolivia decreased in 1999 and 2000 but recovered quickly from the crisis and recorded a positive growth rate again in 2001. Portfolio quality of MFIs deteriorated as well but showed much earlier signs of improvement than portfolio quality of traditional banks (Benoit-Calderón, 2006; Marcony and Mosley, 2005) .
Overall the evidence suggests that while not being immune to episodes of financial turmoil the microfinance industry has performed significantly better in terms of loan portfolio growth and loan portfolio quality than the traditional banking sector.
Crisis-mitigating characteristics of microfinance institutions and borrowers
Several features of microfinance suggest that its superior performance in times of crises compared to that of traditional banks might reflect structural characteristics of the industry.
Lending technology
Microfinance makes use of different lending technologies than the traditional banking sector, namely the group lending and the unconventional individual lending technology (Armendáriz and Murdoch, 2005) . A common characteristic of these technologies is that they are rather conservative. For example, the unconventional individual lending technology assesses the client's debt capacity on the basis of the current cash flow only, i.e. it neglects any potential revenues the client might have from the "project" being financed. Moreover, it includes a socio-economic analysis of the household exploiting the insight that "troubled homes often become troubled borrowers" (Churchill, 1999) . Finally, the credit process is loan officer centric, making close ties to and knowledge of borrowers and local markets. The group lending technology relies on the screening, monitoring and repayment incentives of the joint liability group members when taking a loan (Lehner, 2009 
Ownership
Microfinance institutions, including those operating in the form of non-bank financial institutions and banks with a for-profit objective, have, in general, owners and shareholders with a more "long term strategic interest and are less driven by market forces," (Krauss and Walter, 2006: 18) . This suggests that MFIs are less likely to engage in risky activities due to short-term profit maximization.
The loan product
Microfinance is short-term lending with weekly or monthly installments. This allows for a timely control of the portfolio's quality and for substantial flexibility to adjust lending conditions in times of crisis. Moreover, maturity transformation, a key source of financial instability in traditional banking (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983 ), basically does not exist or -due to long-term funds provided by donors and international financial institutions -has the opposite sign compared to traditional banking: longterm funds are transformed into short-term loans. Finally, the large number and small size of microloans leads to a high degree of granularity and diversification in the MFIs portfolios (Krauss and Walter, 2008) , supporting their stability in crises times.
The clients
Microbusinesses have a loan demand that is mainly related to financing of working capital. Investments in fixed assets such as machinery or real estate are rare as activities do not rely on a substantial capital input (Karland and Murdoch, 2010). This has the advantage that MFI clients have a high degree of flexibility to divert their activities when business slows down. Finally, microfinance clients are usually active in the local trade or service sector. These sectors are less exposed to fluctuations in the global or national economy compared to industry and export oriented companies. As a result, the revenues of microfinance clients are more robust to fluctuations in the economic cycle.
Financial market environment
The main alternative available to microclients' for obtaining a loan is the informal financial sector, which is characterized by high interest rates and a lower degree of reliability compared to MFIs. As a consequence, micro-entrepreneurs have a strong incentive to serve and repay their loans in order to sustain a good relationship with the MFI and and so to obtain future loans (Patten, Rosengard and Johnston, 2001; Chen, Rasmussen and Reille, 2010). Thus, even in a financial crisis, clients will do their utmost to avoid arrears, stabilizing MFI performance indicators.
THE 2000s -HOW MICROFINANCE BECAME PART OF THE GLOBAL CREDIT CYCLE
On the move -microfinance at the beginning of the 21st century
Modern microfinance emerged in the 1970s pioneered by -among others -the Grameen and SEWA banks in Asia and partners of ACCION in Latin America (Helms, 2007) . In more than thirty years it gained a reputation for being one of the most effective instruments in fighting poverty. Moreover, low default rates and an increasing number of sustainable MFIs, showing a positive return to equity, demonstrate that banking with the poor can be a successful business. Finally, most studies suggest that despite strong growth in the past, demand for microfinance services continues to exceed supply by a large amount. Estimates indicate that in many DCs and EMEs 40 to 80 percent of the population lack access to formal financial sector services (Cull et al., 2008; DiLeo and FitzHerbert, 2007) .
The combination of social and economic benefits and the large unmet demand for microfinance attracted new investors and encouraged substantial commercial involvement in the industry. As a result, sources and volumes of funds available to MFIs have increased substantially. While in the past MFIs had to rely almost exclusively on socially-oriented non-profit donors and international financial institutions, it has recently been able to tap broader sources of funds, including funds provided by Microfinance Investment Vehicels (MIVs) completely funded by private investors, mainly from mature economies. In addition, the transformation of many NGOs into microfinance banks has led to a strong increase in client deposits and refinancing lines extended under market conditions. Access to global financial markets, local deposits and domestic credit lines has fundamentally changed the funding situation of the microfinance sector (Krauss and Walter, 2007; DiLeo and FitzHerbert, 2007) allowing for strong loan portfolio growth in many countries. Similar developments have been taking place in the traditional banking sectors of many EMEs and DCs (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2008) . Trends changed only in the aftermath of the Lehman collapse, when credit growth rates and capital inflows slowed substantially in both sectors.
Credit growth in the pre-and post-Lehman period
The years preceding the global financial crisis were characterized by strong credit growth in the microfinance and banking sectors in many EMEs and DCs. In most countries, credit growth in the microfinance sector was higher than in the traditional banking sector (Figure 4 ). While microfinance growth rates above 30 percent p.a. were recorded in 38 countries, there were only 16 traditional banking sectors with growth rates above 30 percent, most of them in ECA. Also in the microfinance sector growth was particularly strong in ECA, reflecting the fact that many ECA microfinance sectors are comparatively young. 
No. of institutions in parantheses
MFIs have different legal forms and can operate as banks, credit unions/cooperatives, non-bank financial institutions, NGOs and rural banks. Banks are by far the largest institutions while rural banks are very small ( Figure 5 ). Despite these significant differences, they recorded similar growth rates in the pre-crisis years. This suggests that credit growth in the microfinance sector was a phenomenon characterizing all institutions regardless of their institutional form. 
Development of capital inflows from 2005 to 2009
Before the crisis the microfinance and banking sectors in EMEs and DCs were the target of strong capital inflows (Figure 7 ). Both sectors gained increasing access to foreign funding at lower costs contributing to the strong growth in credit to micro enterprises and the private sector at large (Dell'Ariccia and Marquez, 2006) . For the traditional banking sector the surge in foreign flows -measured by the external claims of BIS reporting banks on EME and DC banking sectors -has not been a new phenomenon. Indeed, periods of strong inflows followed by sudden stops and rapid reversals have been a key characteristic of financial integration of EMEs and DCs since the mid-1980s (Calvo and Reinhart, 1999; Milesi-Ferretti and Razin, 2000) . By contrast, foreign capital became an important financing source of microfinance only in the early 2000s, when investors with commercial and social interests began channeling significant amounts of funds to MFIs via so-called microfinance investment vehicles (MIVs) (Goodman, 2006) . The available evidence again suggests that patterns of capital inflows were broadly similar in the microfinance and the traditional banking sector. (Figure 7) . It has to be stressed, however, that the availability and quality of data for capital flows to the microfinance sector is still limited. For example, data on the geographical distribution of foreign funding is available only for selected years.
The new boom -bust relationship in microfinance
Credit booms have been a recurrent phenomenon in traditional banking and an important predictor for future banking crises (Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996a and 1996b) . Approximately three quarters of banking crises in emerging countries from 1970 to 2002 have been preceded by periods of rapid credit growth (IMF, 2004) . Moreover, recent theoretical and empirical research on credit booms in the traditional banking sector suggests that the emergence of credit booms goes hand in hand with increasing capital inflows, in particular in DCs and EMEs (Mendoza and Terrones, 2008) . Accordingly, credit booms end with a hard landing when capital flows record a sudden stop or a rapid reversal.
The correlation of capital flows and credit growth was also and has been a feature of developments in the traditional banking sector before and after the global financial crisis years. For the first time, however, similar evidence can be found for the microfinance sector. Indeed, for both sectors the correlation coefficients between credit growth and capital inflows in the period 2005 to 2009 are between 0.7 (microfinance sector) and 0.9 (traditional banking sector) ( Figure 8 ). ico and Uganda represent outliers as they continued to record high growth between 2007 and 2009 despite a boom in the pre-crisis years. Figure 9b displays an even higher significant and strong relationship between high credit growth in 2007 and a severe decrease in lending (measured by the percentage change) in 2009 in the traditional banking sector. Again, countries in ECA such as Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Bulgaria experience at most a decline in lending but also Nigeria and Ghana reports strong decreases.
DIFFERENT TARGET GROUPS, SAME RISKS -DOES THE MI-CROFINANCE SECTOR FACE SIMILAR STABILITY CHAL-LENGES AS THE TRADITIONAL BANKING SECTOR?
Credit booms are associated with rising risks and vulnerabilities. The literature on the traditional banking sector (see e.g. Arcalean et al., 2005) suggests that these vulnerabilities are the result of a) a deterioration of lending standards, b) currency mismatches, partly driven by cross-border borrowing and c) the fight for market shares. This section analyzes whether those risk factors also affected the microfinance sector in the pre-crisis credit boom.
Deterioration of lending standards
Theoretical and empirical research on crises in the traditional banking sector reveals that credit booms have been associated with a decline in bank lending standards (Dell'Ariccia and Marquez, 2006; Jiminez and Saurina, 2006) . Banks become less risk-averse and increasingly accept borrowers with lower credit quality. Investment projects are evaluated on the basis of more optimistic estimates of future cash flows and of inflated asset prices and collateral values (Wolfson, 2002) . Furthermore, banks are confronted with strains on management and lower risk assessment capacities during the boom due to the large number of loans issued often combined with a lack of sufficiently qualified staff (Arcalean et al., 2005; Hernández and Landerretche, 1999) . As long as the credit boom continues, the risks associated with these features remain largely hidden, as new loans -issued on a massive scaledo not show quality problems. Low non-performing loan ratios suggest that the boom is on a sound footing. This changes in the downturn, when new lending comes to a halt and the poor quality of loans issued in the past is revealed.
Focusing on microfinance in the pre-Lehman growth period, MFIs recorded globally low and stable arrears rates, measured as portfolio at risk above 30 days (PAR30), between two and three percent (Median) between 2005 and 2007 (The MiX, 2009), providing evidence for the sector's ability to deliver high portfolio quality. This generated confidence and optimism among MFIs as well as investors. However, funding availability and rapid growth most likely led to a loss of risk aversion and the loosening of MFI characteristic lending standards. As long as the boom continued, the rise in credit risk was masked by the rapid portfolio growth. This changed at the end of 2008, when growth slowed and many MFIs, largely irrespective of size and type, were confronted with severe portfolio quality prob- the average NPL. 5 Indeed, in most countries, the average growth rate of PAR30 from 2008 to 2009 in the microfinance sector was higher than the average NPL growth rate in the traditional banking sector. While PAR30 growth rates above 30 percent p.a. were recorded in 13 countries in the microfinance sector, there were only eight countries with a NPL growth rate higher than 30 percent p.a. in the traditional banking sector. A similar result is obtained when comparing the percentage point changes of PAR30 and NPL in the crises years from 2008 to 2009. While -on average -PAR30 in the microfinance sector rose by 1.5 percentage points, the corresponding increase in the NPL ratio was 0.9 percentage points in 26 EMEs and DCs. Moreover, the familiar cross-regional differences can be observed, with the strongest decline in portfolio quality recorded in ECA, in the microfinance as well as the traditional banking sector. By contrast, portfolio quality has largely remained at pre-crisis levels in South Asia.
The microfinance sector has never before experienced such a negative portfolio quality development, in respect to both the pace of deterioration and the geographical breadth The evidence presented in Figure 10a suggests that countries with high credit growth in the pre-crisis period exhibited a stronger decline inloan portfolio quality in the aftermath of the Lehman collapse.
Exceptions are limited to a few countries. One of them is India which recorded the most rapid credit growth in the pre-crisis period, but only a slight increase in PAR30 between 2008 and 2009. Overall, however, our results indicate that the microfinance sector shows the familiar boom-bust relationship Working Paper No. 156 observed in the traditional banking sector in previous crises as well as in the current crisis. Figure 10b displays a stronger boom-bust relationship in the traditional banking sector for the current crisis and suggests a moderate positive relationship between credit growth in the pre-crisis period and the deterioration of loan portfolio quality in the post-crisis period. Again, the region recording the highest credit growth between 2004 and 2007 and the most severe loan portfolio deterioration in 2008 and 2009 is the ECA region.
Currency mismatches
In the microfinance sector, strong capital inflows led to substantial currency mismatches as most of the inflows were denominated in foreign currency, i.e. US dollar or euro. An estimated 70 percent of cross-border borrowing in the microfinance sector was denominated in hard currency in 2008 (Reille and Foster, 2008) . As a result either MFIs or final borrowers were facing substantial currency risk, depending on whether the MFI transformed foreign currency borrowing into local currency lending or passed the currency risk on to micro borrowers by lending in foreign currency. This risk materialized in the months after the Lehman collapse when currencies of many emerging markets and developing countries depreciated substantially against the US dollar (Littlefield and Kneiding, 2009). Hence, MFIs incurred large losses, as they had an estimated need for local currency hedging in the amount of approximately US$ 1.5 billion in 2009 (Apgar and Reille, 2010). In particular, in the ECA region, i.e. the region recording the highest inflows of capital before the crisis, MFIs and their borrowers have been highly exposed to currency volatility as 84 percent of the cross-border funding by development finance institution to MFIs in ECA was denominated in hard currency (CGAP, 2009b). Again, similar evidence can be found for the traditional banking sector. While banks in most countries did not carry significant open foreign exchange positions, reflecting regulatory constraints and restrictions, they extended foreign currency loans to local borrowers without any foreign currency revenues and hedging possibilities, including households, on a large scale. This was most pronounced in Central and Eastern Europe, fueling the boom in the pre-crisis period and aggravating the bust after the Lehman collapse (Ranciere, Tornell and Vamvakidis, 2010) .
Rising competition and fight for market shares
The pre-crisis credit boom in the microfinance sector was accompanied and partly driven by a fight for market shares. Existing and newly founded MFIs became increasingly aggressive in marketing their services to the target group, also including households -via consumer and housing loans -as well as small and medium sized enterprises (Chen, Rasmussen In the microfinance sector, rising levels of competition have often been accompanied by multiple borrowing, with clients taking loans from more than one MFI at the same time. This holds in particular for countries where credit bureaus are either absent or dysfunctional and credit information is not shared among MFIs. In Bosnia Herzegovina, Nicaragua, Morocco and Pakistan, recent estimates suggest that around 30 to 40 percent of microfinance clients borrowed from more than one MFI in 2009 (Chen et al., 2010; Wisniwski, 2010) . As in previous episodes (Vogelgesang, 2001) , the crisis reveals the overindebtedness, in particular when it is accompanied by a strong decline in economic activity. Moreover, the repayment incentive of the microfinance lending technology, where borrowers only In order to test the link between competition and loan portfolio quality, we examine the degree of competition measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index (HHI) in 2007, and the PAR30 in 2007. HHI can range from zero to one, ranging from a single monopolistic MFI (Index=1) to a larger number of competitive MFIs (Index=0). Therefore, a decrease in HHI shows an increase in competition.
Figure 11: Correlation between competition and loan portfolio quality in the microfinance sector in 2007
Source: The MiX -own compilation
The evidence suggests a significant negative correlation between the HHI and PAR30 in 2007, indicating that the level of competition has had an influence of MFI's portfolio quality before the crisis. However, it should be noted that the correlation coefficient is low. Moreover, when looking at the correlation of competition levels or changes in competition over time and the change in the PAR30 from the pre-to the post-crisis period, the data does not reveal a strong impact of competition on loan portfolio quality in the microfinance sector. 
CONCLUSION
During previous financial crises, microfinance proved to be more crisis-resilient than traditional banking. Since the 2000s, however, the landscape of the microfinance sector has changed. In particular, the microfinance sector has become much more integrated into the international financial system as it has been increasingly able to access foreign funding via global capital markets. These funds contributed to strong credit growth in the pre-Lehman period. As a result, the microfinance sector showed similar developments as the traditional banking sector: high credit growth financed by strong capital inflows. Thus, risks associated with credit booms in the traditional banking sector, like the erosion of lending standards, currency mismatches and a fight for market shares also evolved in the microfinance sector.
After the Lehman collapse, both sectors experienced a severe decline in capital flows, a severe contraction of credit and a noticeable deterioration of loan portfolio quality. Thus, microfinance -like traditional banking -struggled with a freezing of the global credit market right after the Lehman collapse which led to the familiar boom-bust cycle in terms of credit growth and portfolio quality. Moreover, microfinance and the traditional banking sector have been characterized by the same regional differences with regard to the size of the credit boom, the severity of the credit contraction and the decline in loan portfolio quality. In both sectors, ECA recorded the strongest credit growth in the pre-Lehman period and was affected most in the post-Lehman period in credit quantity and quality.
Overall the evidence -albeit still preliminary due to a lack of data for several countries and microfinance institutions -suggests that many microfinance sectors seem to have lost their comparative advantage to traditional banking sectors in terms of crisis resilience recorded in the 1990s. As microfinance has become part of the global credit cycle, it has enjoyed the benefits but also experienced the downside of international financial integration. Hence, the familiar risks associated with capital inflows and credit booms in the traditional banking sector materialized in the microfinance sector in the course of the current financial crisis. This does not imply that microfinance has become just another form of traditional banking. There are still many structural differences with regard to target group, mission, and credit technologies used. However, they seem to show increasing conjunctural similarities driven by global financial market trends. 
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